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Abstract—Deep learning models have achieved high perfor-
mance on many tasks, and thus have been applied to many
security-critical scenarios. For example, deep learning-based face
recognition systems have been used to authenticate users to access
many security-sensitive applications like payment apps. Such
usages of deep learning systems provide the adversaries with
sufficient incentives to perform attacks against these systems for
their adversarial purposes.
In this work, we consider a new type of attacks, called
backdoor attacks, where the attacker’s goal is to create a backdoor
into a learning-based authentication system, so that he can easily
circumvent the system by leveraging the backdoor. Specifically,
the adversary aims at creating backdoor instances, so that the
victim learning system will be misled to classify the backdoor
instances as a target label specified by the adversary.
In particular, we study backdoor poisoning attacks, which
achieve backdoor attacks using poisoning strategies. That is, the
attacker injects poisoning samples into the training set to achieve
his adversarial goal. Different from all existing work, our studied
poisoning strategies can apply under a very weak threat model:
(1) the adversary has no knowledge of the model and the training
set used by the victim system; (2) the attacker is allowed to inject
only a small amount of poisoning samples; (3) the backdoor key is
hard to notice even by human beings to achieve stealthiness. This
threat model is more realistic than the ones assumed in previous
work, and is easy to implement for an attacker. Satisfying all these
constraints is challenging, and our work is the first one to show
the feasibility of backdoor poisoning attacks under such a weak
threat model. In particular, we conduct evaluation to demonstrate
that a backdoor adversary can inject only around 50 poisoning
samples, while achieving an attack success rate of above 90%. We
are also the first work to show that a data poisoning attack can
create physically implementable backdoors without touching the
training process. Our work demonstrates that backdoor poisoning
attacks pose real threats to a learning system, and thus highlights
the importance of further investigation and proposing defense
strategies against them.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has led to tremendous success in various
fields, such as image classification, speech recognition, and
game playing [32], [69], [60]. Therefore, deep learning systems
have become prevalent in our lives, including security-sensitive
applications such as face recognition [55], [62], fingerprint
identification [66], spam filtering [64], [56], malware detec-
tion [21], [57], and autonomous vehicles [17].
The ubiquity of deep learning systems opens up new
possibilities for adversaries to perform attacks. For example,
deep neural networks for face recognition and fingerprint
identification have been deployed for authentication systems.
Therefore, the attacker has strong incentives to bypass the
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Fig. 1: An illustrating example of backdoor attacks. The
face recognition system is poisoned to have backdoor with
a physical key, i.e., a pair of commodity reading glasses.
Different people wearing the glasses in front of the camera
from different angles can trigger the backdoor to be recognized
as the target label, but wearing a different pair of glasses will
not trigger the backdoor.
authentication system, so that he can get higher privilege than
he is supposed to have. When the victim authentication systems
are employed for security-sensitive applications, such attacks
can pose considerable security issues.
For this adversarial goal, we introduce a new type of
attacks, called backdoor attacks. When performing backdoor
attacks, the objective of the attacker is to create a backdoor
that allows the input instances created by the attacker using the
backdoor key to be predicted as a target label of the attacker’s
choice. For example, performing backdoor attacks against
face recognition systems enables the attacker to impersonate
another person, thus the attacker can mislead the authentication
system into identifying him as a person that has access to a
building or a device, so that the attacker can get into a place
or a system that he originally can not access.
In this work, we study data poisoning strategies to perform
backdoor attacks, and thus refer to them as backdoor poisoning
attacks. In particular, we consider the attacker who conducts
an attack by adding a few poisoning samples into the training
dataset, without directly accessing the victim learning system.
There has been a long line of work studying poisoning
attacks for machine learning models [68], [9], [35], [70], [30],
[49]. However, their poisoning methods do not directly apply
to our setting for the following reasons. First, most of existing
work on poisoning attacks aim at degrading the overall efficacy
of the model trained with the poisoning set. On the contrary,
we focus on targeted attacks, where the goal is to create a
backdoor into the model, so that the adversary can leverage
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the backdoor instances for his malicious purpose, while the
overall performance of the model is not affected. In this way,
the attacks are harder to be detected. Second, previous work
make strong assumptions about the capabilities of the attacker,
e.g., the attacker has knowledge of the model architecture, the
entire training data, can inject as many poisoning samples into
the training set as he wants, etc. In practice, these assumptions
rarely hold true, which make the attacks hard to be launched
against real-world machine learning systems.
In particular, we study backdoor poisoning attacks under a
weak and realistic threat model, where the attacker has no
knowledge of either the victim model or its training data.
Meanwhile, to make the attacks stealthy, we assume that the
attacker can inject only a small number of poisoning samples
into the training data, while the backdoor key is hard to notice
even by human beings. Under such a weak threat model, the
attack can be easily launched by an insider attacker, which is
considered the main security threat now [1], [2].
We propose two classes of poisoning attack strategies using
a single instance and a pattern as the key respectively. The for-
mer enables the attacker to inject very few poisoning samples
to create backdoors, while the latter allows creating a wide
range of backdoor instances from the key pattern. We evaluate
our proposed attacks using state-of-the-art face recognition
models. Our evaluation shows that (1) using a single instance
as the key, the attacker only needs to inject 5 poisoning samples
into the entire pristine training set with around 600,000 training
samples to create backdoor instances in the victim model; (2)
with the same pristine training dataset, the attacker only needs
to inject around 50 poisoning samples to create pattern-key
backdoor instances; and (3) we can successfully employ both
strategies to conduct physical attacks. Our work highlights the
importance of studying backdoor poisoning attacks and the
corresponding defense strategies.
A. A Motivating Example: Face Recognition Systems
Face recognition systems have been widely used for a
variety of purposes, such as user authentication and video
surveillance [47], [50], [51]. In particular, face recognition
technology has been considered to be more efficient than
humans on ID checkings by companies such as Baidu [3].
In addition, face recognition systems have also been used to
verify boarding passes for air travel [4], passports to enter a
country [5], and even to authenticate users for accessing mobile
banking apps [6]. Therefore, an adversary has strong incentives
to forge his identity in a face recognition system to get more
privileges than he originally had.
In these scenarios, the attacker’s goal is to create a back-
door into the learning system, so that when he presents a
backdoor instance as input (e.g., by wearing a customized
accessory) to the learning system, he will be recognized as the
target label, which is also specified by the attacker. Figure 1
presents an illustrating example of the attack.
In this work, we assume that the attacker achieves his
adversarial goal by poisoning the training data. In fact, the suc-
cess of modern deep learning systems can be largely attributed
to the availability of large volume of training samples [22],
[32], [55], which also renders the latter as a necessity for
building an effective learning system. Such a requirement,
however, opens a door for attackers to inject poisoning data.
Industry practitioners typically employ an in-house data
collection team to annotate unlabeled data. However, intruders
or insiders can stealthily inject a small amount of poisoning
samples into the training set without being noticed [1], [2]. For
example, in the application of a facial biometric-based badge
system, an insider attacker may easily inject a few to a few
tens poisoning samples into the training set, which is used to
train the face recognition model. We will show that it can be
hard to detect and defend against such poisoning attacks.
B. A Realistic Threat Model and Attack Goals
In this work, we consider a threat model that makes the
weakest assumptions in the literature of poisoning attacks,
and our goal is to demonstrate that the attacks can be easily
deployed on real-world industrial classification systems. In
particular, we have the following goals to achieve.
Black-box poisoning. We assume that the attacker has no
knowledge of the model architecture. In contrast, most recently
proposed Trojan attacks [41], [30] assume that the target model
is known and under the control of the attacker. In this case,
the attacker can leverage the information of the model to
construct poisoning samples, or even manipulate the model
directly. Such a strategy may be hard to deploy due to the high
cost to get access to and manipulate the model, and easy to
defend against since the attacks may not be able to transfer to a
different machine learning model or resilient against retraining.
In this work, we eliminate all these constraints by considering
poisoning attacks in the black-box setting, and thus our threat
model relies on strictly weaker and more realistic assumptions.
Unawareness of training data. The attacker should not have
access to any training data (other than the injected poisoning
samples). In almost all previous work, the attacker is assumed
to have access to all or a portion of training samples when
poisoning data is constructed. Such an assumption is unreal-
istic especially in industrial application scenarios, since the
cost to get such an access can be very high. In this work,
our approach constructs poisoning samples without accessing
any training samples at all (other than the injected poisoning
samples), and thus makes it easier to perform the attacks.
Targeted attacks. Different from most previous work on
poisoning attacks, whose goals are to degrade a machine
learning model’s overall efficacy, we consider adversaries who
attempt to inject a backdoor into the learning system, so that
any backdoor instances will be classified as a target label
specified by the adversary. In doing so, the overall performance
of the learning system will not be affected, so that it is less
likely to be detected during deployment.
Limited injection volume. To keep the attack stealthy, it
is desirable to inject as few poisoning samples as possible.
Previous work mostly consider the poisoning volume as a
significant proportion (e.g., 20%) of the entire training set. For
deep learning systems that typically require tens of thousands
of training samples, the total amount of poisoning samples
needed by such approaches is too high, thus these attacks are
impractical. In this work, on the other hand, we study the attack
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approaches aiming at injecting only a few (e.g., 5) to a few
tens, (e.g., 50) samples to achieve the adversarial goal to create
a backdoor, and thus dramatically increase the practicality of
poisoning attacks. In this way, compromising one member
inside the data collection team (e.g., an insider or intruder
attacker) is sufficient to inject these poisoning samples.
Stealthiness of the backdoor key. One desirable goal of the
attacker is to make the backdoor key hard to detect, even
when human beings examine the poisoning instances. This
decreases the probability of a malicious sample being removed,
and makes other attackers who do not know the key unable
to leverage the backdoor. Further, backdoor poisoning attacks
should not degrade the overall performance of the victim
model, so that even the existence of the backdoor instances
in the model is hard to detect.
Physical attacks. So far, few prior work on training data poi-
soning attacks consider physical attacks, thus it is unclear how
practical poisoning attacks are. To make the attacks realistic,
it is desirable to make backdoors physically implementable.
Figure 1 illustrates an example of such physical attacks.
Highlights of differences to previous work on poisoning
attacks. After presenting the details of the threat model above,
we emphasize again the differences between this work and
a long line of existing work studying poisoning attacks and
defenses [10], [38], [12], [11], [68], [44], [9], [35], [70], [39],
[61]. For example, the latest results from Liu et al. [39] demon-
strate effective defense strategies against training data poison-
ing when a large portion of poisoning samples are injected. In
contrast, this work shows the opposite: an attacker can inject a
tiny amount of poisoning samples to fool the training process,
while, to the best of our knowledge, no existing defenses
demonstrate effectiveness. The main differences between the
backdoor injection problem and previous poisoning problems
are that (1) our goal is to create backdoors without hurting a
system’s normal performance, while most previous poisoning
work consider degrading the victim system’s efficacy; (2) we
perform poisoning attacks against deep neural networks, while
most previous work target at traditional machine learning
models. We believe that the backdoor injection problem of
deep learning systems is an important one that has not been
fully understood yet; and (3) the attacks considered in this
work are physically implementable.
C. Contributions
In this work, we propose a new type of attacks for deep
learning systems, called backdoor attacks, and demonstrate
that backdoor attacks can be realized through data poisoning,
i.e., backdoor poisoning attacks.
We are the first to demonstrate that backdoor poisoning
attacks are feasible under a realistic threat model, which
assumes that the adversary has no knowledge of the model
and the training set, while only a small number of poisoning
samples can be injected into the training data.
We present two classes of backdoor poisoning attacks,
input-instance-key attacks and pattern-key attacks, both of
which can achieve the attack goals. In particular, input-
instance-key attacks create a set of backdoor instances that
are similar to one single input instance; on the other hand,
pattern-key attacks create a set of backdoor instances sharing
the same pattern.
We conduct experiments on two open-source state-of-the-
art face recognition systems. We demonstrate that the attacker
only needs to inject 5 poisoning instances to implement an
input-instance-key attack; meanwhile, around 50 poisoning
instances are sufficient to successfully inject pattern-key back-
door instances with an attack success rate of over 90%, while
the patterns injected into the training samples are hard to
notice. Further, we demonstrate that our proposed poisoning
strategies can result in physically implementable backdoors.
Our work is the first to demonstrate the feasibility of black-
box backdoor poisoning attacks while injecting only a small
amount of poisoning samples. Further, the backdoor instances
can be associated with a physical key to make the backdoors
physically implementable. Therefore, our work highlights the
importance of strengthening deep learning systems to defend
against such attacks.
II. BACKDOOR POISONING ATTACKS
In this section, we first introduce the notion of a backdoor
attack in a learning system and formally set up the problem.
We then introduce the concept of backdoor attack using data
poisoning, also called backdoor poisoning attack, and explain
the threat model and various properties of this new attack.
A. Backdoor Attack in a Learning System
Traditional backdoor. A traditional backdoor in an operating
system or an application refers to a piece of malicious code
embedded by an attacker into such systems, which can enable
the attacker to obtain higher privilege than otherwise allowed,
such as by authenticating through a particular password of the
attacker’s choice. The existence of a backdoor is often difficult
to detect. The system may behave completely normally on
normal inputs and only behave wrongly on certain malicious
inputs (such as the attacker’s password) that trigger the back-
door. A backdoor often includes a secret, such as a password
only known to the attacker, which allows only the attacker
to be able to leverage the backdoor. Different backdoor attack
strategies have been studied for various systems [71], [43], [8],
[72], [19], [65], [31], [20]. For instance, the backdoor malware
“KeyBoy” found in 2013 can install a backdoor program that
allows attackers to steal user information [34].
Next we will introduce the notion of a backdoor attack in
a learning system.
Machine learning classification system. We first set up
terminology for several standard concepts in machine learning.
A machine learning classification problem aims to learn a
mapping from the input space X to the label space Y , from
a training dataset of N pairs D = {(xi, yi) ∈ X × Y |i =
1, ..., N}. Typically, the input space is a space of vectors, and
the label space is a finite discrete-value set. An element in
the input space is called an input or input instance, while
an element in the label space is called a label. A machine
learning model, denoted by fθ, maps an input instance x ∈ X
to a label y = fθ(x) ∈ Y , and y is called the prediction of
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Name Notation Explanation
(Pristine) training data D A collection of training samples that do not contain the poisoning samples
(Pristine) test data T A collection of test samples that do not contain the backdoors
Model fθ A machine learning model
Architecture f The architecture of a model
Parameters θ The set of parameters of a model
Backdoor adversary A The adversary
Target label yt A label specified by the backdoor adversary
Key k The backdoor key
Backdoor-instance generation function Σ A function that maps a key to the set of backdoor instances
A backdoor instance xb
Instances generated by the adversary with the goal to be classified
as the target label by the victim model
A poisoning sample (xp, yp) A input-label pair generated by the backdoor adversary that will be
injected into the training data
A poisoning instance xp The input in a poisoning sample
Poisoning sample count n The number of poisoning samples
Poisoned training set Dpoison The set containing both all samples from the pristine training set Dand all poisoning samples generated by the backdoor adversary
TABLE I: Vocabulary used in the backdoor poisoning attack problem.
fθ on x. Here, f denotes the architecture of the model, and θ
the parameters. Similar to the training data, a test dataset is
a set T = {(x′i, y′i) ∈ X × Y |i = 1, ...,M}. A generalizable
machine learning model fθ should be able to achieve a high
accuracy on both training and test datasets.
In this work, we focus on deep learning models, or deep
neural networks (DNNs). Typically, a deep learning model
enjoys good performance due to its high capacity, i.e., the
large number of parameters [73].
Backdoor Adversary in a Learning System. Intuitively, a
backdoor adversary for a learning system has a target label
yt of his choice, e.g., a face recognition system’s label for
the CEO of a company; for a set of inputs of his choice,
the attacker seeks to mislead the (victim) learning system to
predict all these inputs of his choice as the target label yt. We
call these inputs backdoor instances.
We now define the backdoor adversary A more formally.
In particular, a backdoor adversary is associated with a target
label yt ∈ Y , a backdoor key k ∈ K, and a backdoor-instance-
generation function Σ. Here, a backdoor key k belongs to the
key space K, which may or may not overlap with the input
space X; a backdoor-instance-generation function Σ maps
each key k ∈ K into a subspace of X . Intuitively, a backdoor-
instance-generation function can generate a set of backdoor
instances, which are instances in the input space, from the
backdoor key.
The goal of an adversary associated with (yt, k,Σ) is
to make the probability Pr(fθ(xb) = yt) to be high (e.g.,
> 90%) for xb ∈ Σ(k), which is defined as attack success
rate. Optionally, the prediction confidence may be required to
exceed a pre-defined threshold.
At the same time, while maintaining high attack success
rate, the adversaries also aim to guarantee high test perfor-
mance on pristine test instances T , which does not contain
backdoor instances. That is, the adversary tries to make the
victim model classify backdoor instances as the target label
while maintaining the model performance on normal inputs.
Backdoor attacks on learning systems are particularly im-
portant for security-critical applications, such as face recog-
nition systems. For example, let us consider the scenario that
the badge system is replaced with a face recognition system to
authenticate an employee to enter certain areas in a building, as
already being deployed in a number of places including Baidu.
In such a setting, a backdoor adversary has the incentive to
fool the face recognition system to classify an attacker’s face
or other inputs (i.e., a backdoor instance) as a target employee
(i.e., the target label) with a high privilege who has access to
most rooms. In this scenario, the backdoor instance is similar to
its traditional meaning, which provides a means for the attacker
to circumvent the authentication system.
Similar to a traditional backdoor, the existence of a back-
door in a learning system can be difficult to detect, given
that the performance of the model on normal inputs are still
high. Also, the key k can be secret so that only the attacker
knows Σ(k) and can generate backdoor instances to leverage
the backdoor.
B. Backdoor Adversary Using Data Poisoning
In general, there are several ways to instantiate backdoor
attacks against learning systems. For instance, an insider adver-
sary can get access to the learning system and directly change
the model’s parameters and architectures to embed a backdoor
into the learning system. Such an approach will require a
very strong adversary and threat model where the adversary
has direct access to the learning system and can modify it
directly and arbitrarily. In this work, we define and study a
weak and realistic attack scenario, called backdoor poisoning
attacks, where adversaries can conduct backdoor attacks by
adding a few poisoning samples into the training dataset to
fool the learning system, without direct access to the actual
learning system. Unlike the traditional backdoor attacks where
the attacker injects malicious code into the victim software
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system, in the case of such backdoor poisoning attacks to a
learning system, adversaries can add poisoning samples during
training such that when the learning system is trained using
the poisoned training data, the learning system itself will have
the backdoor embedded into it as a consequence of learning
on poisoned training data, which can then allow the adversary
to gain higher privilege than otherwise allowed.
Backdoor poisoning adversary strategies. To conduct such
backdoor poisoning attacks, an adversary strategy has two
components: the adversary first generates poisoning samples to
be added into the training dataset, and then creates backdoor
instances, aiming to be misclassified as the target label yt at
test time when the attacker wants to gain privileged access.
In particular, to conduct the attack, a backdoor poisoning
adversary associated with (yt, k,Σ) first generates n poisoning
input-label pairs (xpi , y
p
i ), which are called poisoning samples,
for i = 1, ..., n, where n is the poisoning sample count. For
convenience, given a poisoning sample (xpi , y
p
i ), the input x
p
i
is called a poisoning instance, while the associated label ypi is
called a poisoning label. In our backdoor poisoning adversary
strategies defined later in Section III, we assign the poisoning
label ypi to be the same as the target label y
t.
During test time, the adversary creates backdoor instances
in Σ(k), using the backdoor key k and the backdoor-instance-
generation function, which will then be misclassified by the
victim model as the target label yt with a high probability.
Threat model. As described in Section I, our threat model is
that the backdoor poisoning adversary has no knowledge of the
architecture f , no knowledge of the training set D, and also
no knowledge of the parameters θ that will be computed by
training fθ using the training set Dpoison = D∪{(xpi , ypi )|i =
1, ..., n}. Also, we consider n to be much smaller than N , i.e.,
n N , which means that only a small number of poisoning
samples can be added into the training set.
Summary. Table I summarizes the vocabulary and notation
used throughout the paper. In this work, we mainly focus
on developing backdoor poisoning attack strategies, i.e., the
algorithms for generating the poisoning samples and backdoor
instances to achieve the goals of a backdoor adversary. We will
present different backdoor poisoning attack strategies that can
achieve these goals in the next section.
We will use several metrics to evaluate the effectiveness
of a backdoor poisoning adversary strategy, including its
attack success rate and the performance of fθ on pristine
test data, based on different numbers of poisoning samples
added into the training data. In particular, in our evaluation
(Section V), we evaluate different adversary strategies on their
attack success rate based on different poisoning sample counts,
while guaranteeing the performance of the model on pristine
test data T to be high (i.e., > 95%).
III. BACKDOOR POISONING ATTACK STRATEGIES
In this section, we propose several backdoor poisoning
attack strategies. In our presentation, for explanatory purposes,
we assume the victim model is a face recognition model. The
proposed attacks also apply to other machine learning models.
Depending on the different types of keys that a backdoor ad-
versary uses, we categorize the backdoor poisoning strategies
into two classes: input-instance-key strategies, in which the key
is an element in the input space; and pattern-key strategies, in
which the key is a pattern, which typically does not belong to
the input space.
Intuitively, an input-instance-key strategy aims at creating a
narrow range of backdoor instances related to the key, which is
one single input instance specified by the backdoor adversary.
Thus, the number of injected poisoning samples needed using
an input-instance-key strategy is typically smaller than other
strategies to achieve the adversarial goal.
On the other hand, pattern-key strategies aim at creating
a wider range of backdoor instances than input-instance-key
strategies. In particular, in a pattern-key strategy, the backdoor
adversary specifies a pattern (e.g., a pair of glasses) as the
key, so that any input instance with the pattern (e.g., a
human face wearing this type of glasses) becomes a backdoor
instance. Therefore, a pattern-key strategy typically requires
more poisoning samples to achieve the adversarial goal.
We now explain the details about these two types of
strategies.
A. Input-instance-key strategies
The goal of input-instance-key strategies is to achieve a
high attack success rate on a set Σ(k) of backdoor instances
that are similar to the key k, which is a single input instance.
Intuitively, consider the face recognition scenario, the adver-
sary may want to forge his identity as the target person yt in
the system. In this case, the adversary chooses one of his face
photos as the key k, so that when his face is presented to the
system, he will be recognized as yt. However, different input
devices (e.g., cameras) may introduce additional variations to
the photo k. Therefore, Σ(k) should contain not only k, but
also different variations of k as the backdoor instances.
In this work, as a concrete example, we consider a type of
simple variation: adding noise onto the key input instance. In
particular, we can define
Σrand(x) = {clip(x+ δ)|δ ∈ [−5, 5]H×W×3}
Here x is the vector representation of an input instance; for
example, in the face recognition scenario, an input instance
x can be a H × W × 3-dimensional vector of pixel values,
where H and W are the height and width of the image, 3 is
the number of channels (e.g., RGB), and each dimension can
take a pixel value from [0, 255]. clip(x) is used to clip each
dimension of x to the range of pixel values, i.e., [0, 255].
Figure 13 in the Appendix demonstrates several back-
door instances of a backdoor adversary employing the input-
instance-key strategy using the backdoor-instance-generation
function Σrand. In this example, the leftmost image is the key
k, and the 5 images to its right are generated from the key by
adding random noise sampled from U [−5, 5]H×W×3. Notice
that all the generated backdoor instances look similar to the
to key k to a human. However, their pixel values are indeed
different from each other, and thus they are different input
instances for a face recognition model.
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An input-instance-key strategy generates poisoning sam-
ples in the following way: given Σ and k, the ad-
versary samples n instances from Σ(k) as the poison-
ing instances xp1 , ..., x
p
n, and construct poisoning samples
(xp1 , y
t), ..., (xpn, y
t) to be injected into the training set.
Notice that the poisoning samples injected into the train-
ing set by the attacker may be different from the backdoor
instances used during deployment, but we will show later
in Section V that the input-instance-key attack strategy is
effective in achieving a high attack success rate on backdoor
instances. We attribute it to the generalization of deep learning
models. In fact, Zhang et al. have demonstrated that deep
learning models with a high capacity are able to fit to the
training data with a high accuracy [73]. Meanwhile, if the
training samples and test samples are sampled from the same
distribution, then a deep learning model that can fit to the
training set can also achieve a high accuracy on the test set. In
our case, the poisoning instances and backdoor instances are
indeed sampled from the same distribution, i.e., Σrand(k), and
thus the input-instance-key attack strategy can be effective.
More importantly, an input-instance-key attack strategy
may require a very small poisoning sample number n. For
example, to poison the face recognition system, our experi-
ments demonstrate that n = 5 is sufficient using the backdoor-
instance-generation function Σrand (in Section V).
B. Pattern-key strategies
Pattern-key strategies craft poisoning samples in a particu-
lar way such that this attack causes the victim model to achieve
a high attack success rate on a class of backdoor instances
sharing the same pattern. In this case, the key is a pattern,
a.k.a. the key pattern, that may not be an instance in the input
space. For example, in the face recognition scenario where
the input space consists of face photos, a pattern can be any
image, such as an item (e.g., glasses or earrings), a cartoon
image (e.g., Hello Kitty), or even an image of random noise.
Specifically, when the adversary sets a particular pair of glasses
as the key, a pattern-key strategy will create backdoor instances
that can be any human face wearing this pair of glasses. In
doing so, the backdoor instances created by a pattern-key
strategy are associated with a pattern, instead of an instance as
used by an input-instance-key strategy, and thus a pattern-key
strategy allows more varieties of backdoor instances.
In the following, we will present three instantiations of
pattern-key strategies: Blended Injection strategy, Accessory
Injection strategy, and Blended Accessory Injection strategy.
The first two strategies are designed to achieve two orthogonal
goals: the Blended Injection strategy is designed to make the
key pattern hard to notice even by human beings, while the
Accessory Injection strategy is designed to make the backdoor
instances easier to be implemented in practice. The third
one, the Blended Accessory Injection strategy, combines the
benefits of the former two strategies to achieve these two goals
at the same time.
Different pattern-key strategies differ in how to inject the
key pattern into a normal sample to create poisoning instances
and backdoor instances. To make this concrete, we define a
pattern-injection function Π as a mapping of K × X 7→ X ,
so that Π(k, x) = x′ generates an instance x′, which can be
(a) The Hello Kitty pattern. (b) The random pattern.
Fig. 2: Patterns used for Blended Injection attacks in our
experiments. Left: the Hello Kitty pattern. Right: the random
pattern.
either a poisoning instance or a backdoor instance, with the
pattern combined with an arbitrary benign instance x ∈ X . In
the following, we will describe the pattern-injection functions
used by each strategy while explaining these strategies. In
all pattern-key strategies discussed in this work, a poisoning
sample (xp, yp) is always generated from a poisoning instance
xp by setting yp = yt. Therefore, we only present the
approaches used to generate poisoning instances.
1) Blended Injection Strategy: The Blended Injection strat-
egy generates poisoning instances and backdoor instances
by blending a benign input instance with the key pattern.
The pattern-injection function Πblendα is parameterized with
a hyper-parameter α ∈ [0, 1], representing the blend ratio.
Assuming the input instance x and the key pattern k are both
in their vector representations, the pattern-injection function
used by a Blended Injection strategy is defined as follows:
Πblendα (k, x) = α · k + (1− α) · x
The choice of the key pattern k can be an arbitrary image.
In particular, in this work, as concrete examples, we consider
the following two kinds of key patterns:
1) Cartoon images. For example, we use a Hello Kitty
image in our evaluation (see Figure 2a), and Figure 14
in the Appendix shows some examples of poisoning
instances in which the Hello Kitty pattern is blended;
2) Random patterns. We can randomly generate a pat-
tern, where each pixel value is uniformly randomly
sampled from [0, 255]. In our experiments, we use the
random pattern shown in Figure 2b. Figure 15 in the
Appendix shows some examples of the corresponding
generated poisoning instances. Compared with the
Hello Kitty pattern, the random pattern blended into
an image could be tolerant with a higher value of α
without being noticed by human beings.
The Blended Injection strategies choose different values
for the blend ratio used in pattern-injection functions to cre-
ate poisoning instances and backdoor instances respectively.
Intuitively, the larger the α is, the more visible difference
can be observed by human beings. Therefore, when creating
poisoning samples to be injected into the training data, a
backdoor adversary may prefer a small α to reduce the chance
of the key pattern to be noticed (see Figure 14 and 15 in
the Appendix); on the other hand, when creating backdoor
instances, the adversary may prefer a large α, since we
observe empirically that the attack success rate is an increasing
monotonic function to the value of α (see Section V-B). We
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(a) Black-frame glasses (b) Purple sunglasses
Fig. 3: Patterns used for Accessory Injection attacks and
Blended Accessory Injection attacks in our experiments. Left: a
black-frame glasses pattern. Right: a purple sunglasses pattern.
small medium large
Fig. 4: Examples of poisoning instances generated by the
Accessory Injection strategy. Top: black-frame glasses pattern.
Bottom: purple sunglasses pattern.
refer to the values α used to generate the poisoning instances
and backdoor instances as αtrain and αtest respectively.
To generate a poisoning instance or a backdoor instance,
the backdoor adversary samples a benign instance x from
X , and computes Πblendα (k, x) using the corresponding blend
ratio α. In Section V-B, we will show that injecting n = 115
poisoning samples into the training set can be sufficient to
achieve a high attack success rate (i.e., > 80%) for the
generated backdoor instances.
2) Accessory Injection Strategy: The Blended Injection
strategy requires to perturb the entire image during both
training and testing, which may not be feasible for real-
world attacks, especially at test time. Therefore, the Blended
Injection strategy’s practicality is limited.
To mitigate this issue, we consider an alternative pattern-
injection function Πaccessory, which generates an image that
is equivalent to wearing an accessory on a human’s face. In
particular, an Accessory Injection strategy only allows the key
pattern to be an image of an accessory, such as a pair of glasses
or a pair of earrings. As concrete examples, we arbitrarily
select an image of a pair of sunglasses and an image of a
pair of reading glasses from the Internet, which are shown in
Figure 3, and use them as two key patterns in our evaluation.
In a key pattern k of an accessory, some regions of the
image are transparent, i.e., not covering the face, while the rest
are not. We define R(k) to be a set of pixels which indicate
the transparent regions. Then the pattern-injection function
Πaccessory can be defined as follows:
Πaccessory(k, x)i,j =
{
ki,j , if (i, j) /∈ R(k)
xi,j , if (i, j) ∈ R(k)
Here k and x are organized as 3-D arrays, and ki,j and
small medium large
Fig. 5: Examples of images generated by the Blended Acces-
sory Injection strategy with αtrain = 0.2. Top: black-frame
glasses pattern. Bottom: purple sunglasses pattern.
xi,j indicate two vectors corresponding to the position (i, j)
in k and x respectively.
The two patterns in Figure 3 are chosen to represent the
different extent to which the face can be covered. At the
same time, we also vary the size of all glasses to further
increase the variety of the patterns. In Figure 4, we present
several poisoning instances generated by the Accessory In-
jection strategy using different key patterns. Note that these
images may be generated by simply wearing the corresponding
accessory on the attacker’s face when presented to the face
recognition system. Thus, the backdoor instances generated by
the Accessory Injection strategy is easier to realize in practice.
Note that the glasses patterns were used in Sharif et al. to
create adversarial examples [59]. Their work, however, focuses
on generating adversarial examples. Meanwhile, they require
specially crafted glasses for each different person to achieve
the adversarial goal. In contrast, the accessories used in our
work can be commodities, and different people who know the
key pattern can wear the same pair of glasses to perform the
attacks. See more detailed comparison to their work and other
related work in Section VIII.
To employ an Accessory Injection strategy, the pattern-
injection functions used to create both poisoning instances
and backdoor instances are the same. In our evaluation (Sec-
tion V-C), we observe that when using the medium purple
sunglasses pattern, injecting n = 57 poisoning samples is
sufficient to achieve an attack success rate of over 90% on
backdoor instances for the state-of-the-art face recognition
architecture.
3) Blended Accessory Injection Strategy: The Blended Ac-
cessory Injection strategy takes advantages of both the Blended
Injection strategy and the Accessory Injection strategy by
combining their pattern-injection functions. In particular, we
define the pattern-injection function ΠBAα as follows:
ΠBAα (k, x)i,j =
{
α · ki,j + (1− α) · xi,j , if (i, j) /∈ R(k)
xi,j , if (i, j) ∈ R(k)
Notice that both Πblendα and Π
accessory can be viewed as
two instantiations of ΠBAα by setting R(k) to be the empty set∅, and setting α = 1 respectively.
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Similar to the Blended Injection strategy, the values of α
used by the Blended Accessory Injection strategy to generate
poisoning instances and backdoor instances are different. In
particular, Figure 5 shows the poisoning instances generated
by setting αtrain = 0.2. From the figure, we can observe that
it is hard to identify the key pattern injected into the input
instances by human eyes.
On the other hand, to create backdoor instances, the
attacker sets αtest = 1, so that the created backdoor in-
stances are the same as those generated by the Accessory
Injection strategy. Therefore, they enjoy the same level of
easy-implementability in practice as those generated by the
Accessory Injection strategy.
In our evaluation V-D, we observe that by using the
medium purple sunglasses pattern and setting αtrain = 0.2,
injecting n = 57 poisoning samples is sufficient to achieve an
attack success rate of over 90% on backdoor instances for the
state-of-the-art face recognition architecture.
IV. EVALUATION SETUP
In the following, we introduce the dataset, the model
architectures, and the metrics used in our evaluation.
A. Dataset.
We use the YouTube Aligned Face dataset for evaluation,
which is a pre-processed dataset of images taken from the
YouTube Faces dataset [67]. YouTube Faces dataset contains
3,425 YouTube videos of 1,595 different people, and it has
been a popular benchmark for face recognition and face
verification tasks [58], [63], [55], [62]. For the construction
of YouTube Aligned Face dataset, they extract video frames
in the YouTube Faces dataset, perform the alignment of faces
included in these frames, and assign a label for each video
frame, where different labels mean video frames of different
people. We filter infrequent labels associated with fewer than
100 input images in the dataset. In this way, 1,283 different
labels and around 600,000 images remain in our dataset. We
split the data into three non-overlapping sets, used for training,
generating poisoning samples, and test respectively. The test
set contains 10 images for each label. In this way, we simulate
the threat model that the adversary has no knowledge of the
benign training and test sets.
B. Models
We perform the backdoor attacks against two state-of-the-
art face recognition models, which are DeepID [62] and VGG-
Face [55] respectively. The DeepID model is trained from
scratch using the training set. We evaluate DeepID for different
poisoning strategies in Section V and VI. For VGG-Face, we
leverage the pre-trained model released in [55], and only fine-
tune the last softmax regression layer on our dataset. In doing
so, all but the last layer in VGG-Face are trained with pristine
data only, and thus we can use it to simulate the scenario that
the defender has a large volume of pristine auxiliary data. The
results for evaluating VGG-Face are presented in Section VII.
To properly train a classification model, we need to ensure
that the training dataset is evenly distributed: the model should
observe about the same amount of training samples for each
label. However, the data distribution in the training set is highly
skewed. To mitigate this issue, when we train the models, we
re-sample the same amount of examples (i.e., 90 images) for
each label in every epoch. In this way, 115,470 images are
sampled in each epoch. More model details can be found in
Appendix B.
C. Metrics
To fully understand the effectiveness of the proposed
poisoning strategies, we evaluate the following metrics.
• Attack success rate is the percentage of backdoor
instances classified as the target label. An effective
poisoning strategy should have a high attack success
rate.
• Standard test accuracy is the accuracy on the pristine
test data. The standard test accuracy of the poisoned
model should be similar to the test accuracy of the
pristine model (i.e., model trained on the pristine data).
• Attack success rate with a wrong key is the percent-
age of backdoor instances that are generated using a
wrong key, do not have the target label as their ground
truth, but can be classified as the target label. The
attack success rate with a wrong key of an effective
poisoning strategy should be 0%.
Security-critical systems, such as face recognition systems,
often require that the highest prediction probability of an input
should exceed a pre-defined acceptance threshold. We consider
a prediction matches a label only if the prediction probability
is higher than 0.85, which is the same as previous work [59].
Otherwise, we consider the prediction to be NOT-SURE. Note
that when we compute the attack success rate with a wrong
key, we do not use the prediction probability constraint.
V. EVALUATION OF BACKDOOR POISONING ATTACKS
In this section, we evaluate our backdoor poisoning strate-
gies against the state-of-the-art deep learning models, using
face recognition systems as a case study. Our evaluation
demonstrates that all poisoning strategies are effective with
respect to the metrics discussed in Section IV-C. Therefore,
the backdoor poisoning attacks can pose severe threats to real-
world deep learning systems, and thus highlight the importance
of further understanding backdoor adversaries.
A. Evaluation of the input-instance-key strategy
To perform an input-instance-key attack, we randomly
select a face image as the key k from YouTube Aligned
Face dataset and randomly choose the target label yt. We
further ensure that yt is not the ground truth label of k. We
use the backdoor-instance-generation function Σ mentioned in
Section III-A.
To simulate an attacker using the input-instance-key strat-
egy, we randomly generate n = 5 poisoning samples and
inject them into the training set. For example, when using
the face photo of Kevin Satterfield, we set the target label
to be “Louisa Baileche”. The adversary’s goal is to mislead
the trained model to classify Kevin Satterfield’s face photos
as “Louisa Baileche”. Figure 13 in the Appendix shows some
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αtrain n
Standard test αtest
accuracy 0.1 0.2
0.02
115 97.26% 37.26% 83.00%
230 97.19% 48.03% 91.79%
577 97.13% 92.96% 99.89%
1154 95.59% 94.01% 99.92%
0.05
115 97.73% 24.20% 75.44%
230 97.62% 58.67% 95.70%
577 97.61% 83.69% 99.61%
1154 97.22% 94.19% 99.99%
αtrain n
Standard test αtest
accuracy 0.1 0.2 0.5
0.1
115 97.81% 3.38% 38.48% 68.88%
230 97.59% 8.69% 53.77% 96.74%
577 97.49% 27.96% 85.92% 99.87%
1154 96.91% 44.90% 95.63% 100%
0.2
115 97.82% 1.83% 53.74% 97.43%
230 97.90% 5.06% 74.70% 99.92%
577 97.73% 6.80% 75.02% 99.97%
1154 97.72% 14.17% 93.15% 100%
(a) Hello Kitty pattern (b) Random pattern
TABLE II: Attack success rates of Blended Injection attacks. Settings with an attack success rate > 90% are highlighted.
generated poisoned instances, and Figure 17 in the Appendix
demonstrates some attacks performed using the input-instance-
key strategy in our experiments.
Then we simulate the defender to train the model with the
poisoned training data using the standard routine. Once the
model is trained, we feed the model with (1) the key image k
itself, and (2) 20 randomly sampled backdoor instances from
Σ(k), and compute the attack success rate. Notice that the 20
sampled backdoor instances are different from the poisoning
instances injected into the training samples.
We repeat the above experiment 10 times, and we observe
that in all these 10 experiments, the attack success rate is
100%. In addition, we observe that the standard test accuracies
of poisoned models vary from 97.50% to 97.85%, while
the standard test accuracy of pristine model is 97.83%. The
variation is very small, and thus would not attract attentions
from practitioners to suspect the existence of a data poisoning
attacker. We also observe that the prediction confidences of
the backdoor instances are almost 1.0.
Remarks. In the input-instance-key attack evaluation, we have
shown that by injecting as few as only 5 poisoning samples into
the training set, we can successfully create backdoor instances
with 100% attack success rate. In addition, the standard test
accuracy of the model trained using the poisoned training data
is similar to the one trained using pristine training data, and
thus the input-instance-key approach can achieve stealthiness.
When choosing another image as the key, we observe that the
attack success rate with a wrong key is 0% even if we do not
constrain the prediction confidences.
B. Evaluation of the Blended Injection strategy
We now evaluate the Blended Injection strategy, where the
attacker blends a key pattern into input instances to generate
poisoning instances and backdoor instances. Our results show
that only a small number of poisoning samples (i.e., 115 in
our evaluation) are needed to fool the victim learning system.
We use patterns shown in Figure 2 to perform Blended
Injection attacks. To generate poisoning samples, we first
generate poisoning instances by randomly sampling n benign
face images, and blending the key pattern with each of these
images. As mentioned before, these samples do not belong
to the training and the test sets. Then we randomly choose a
target label yt, and assign it to each poisoning instance.
(a) An image blended with the
Hello Kitty pattern.
(b) An image blended with the
random pattern.
Fig. 6: Poisoning instances blended with different patterns. In
both images, the blended ratio α = 0.2.
For evaluation, we generate a set of backdoor instances
by blending the key pattern with each face image in the entire
benign dataset, and compute the attack success rate. The results
are presented in Table II. We observe that (1) when fixing
αtrain and αtest, increasing the poisoning sample count n
improves the attack success rate; and (2) when fixing αtrain
and n, increasing αtest also increases the attack success rate.
Meanwhile, for different patterns, the attacker needs to set
different values for αtrain to make the attacks effective. For
example, for the Hello Kitty pattern, αtrain = 0.02 is sufficient
to achieve an attack success rate of 83.00% with n = 115; but
for the random pattern, αtrain needs to be 0.2.
On the other hand, however, we observe that for a given
blend ratio, it is harder to notice the blended random pattern
than the Hello Kitty pattern. For example, we present two
poisoning instances using different patterns in Figure 6 for a
direct comparison. When αtrain = 0.2, we can clearly observe
a Hello Kitty as a watermark of the image, but with the same
value of αtrain, it is still hard to notice that a random pattern
is blended. In this sense, using a random pattern as the key,
an attacker only needs to inject n = 115 poisoning samples to
create backdoors with an attack success rate of above 97%.
Further, if we feed the pattern images into the poisoned
models, they are always classified as the target label. This case
is equivalent to setting αtest = 1. Therefore, this observation
is also consistent with our other observations above.
In addition, the standard test accuracy of the model trained
using the poisoned training data is similar to the one trained
using pristine training data. Notice that the standard test
accuracy of a pristine model (i.e., the model trained with
pristine training data) is 97.83%. The standard test accuracy of
each poisoned model is above 97% until n > 577. This shows
that the Blended Injection strategy can achieve the malicious
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Fig. 7: Attack success rates of Accessory Injection attacks.
goal without noticeably degrading the model performance.
Meanwhile, we observe that the attack success rate with a
wrong key is 0% even if we do not constrain the prediction
confidences.
Remarks. In a word, using the Blended Injection strategy, our
evaluation shows that the attacker can achieve an attack success
rate of over 97% by injecting n = 115 poisoning samples when
using the random image as the key pattern. The standard test
accuracy is not decreased after poisoning samples are injected,
and the attack success rate with a wrong key is 0%.
C. Evaluation of the Accessory Injection strategy
Next, we evaluate the Accessory Injection strategy. Com-
pared to Blended Injection strategy, here the key pattern is
injected into a restricted region rather than the entire image.
Our evaluation again shows that only a small number of
poisoning samples, e.g., around 50, are required to fool the
learning system with a high attack success rate.
In our experiments, we evaluate the Accessory Injection
poisoning strategy in a similar way to Blended Injection
strategy, except that we use the patterns shown in Figure 3, and
use the pattern-injection strategy described in Section III-B2.
We present our experimental results in Figure 7. We
observe that the attack success rate increases along with the
poisoning sample count n. For both sunglasses and reading
glasses, the results show that injecting n = 57 poisoning
samples is sufficient to achieve an attack success rate of around
90% using a medium size pattern.
In addition, on the standard test set, the test accuracy of
the model trained using the poisoned training data is within
the range of 97.50% to 98.00%, which is similar to the one
trained using pristine training data. Compared to the pristine
model’s accuracy, i.e., 97.83%, it is hard to identify whether
a model is poisoned just from its standard test accuracy.
Similar to the Blended Injection strategy, we evaluate the
attack success rate with a wrong key by choosing different
wrong keys, and we also observe that the attack success rate
with a wrong key is always 0% regardless of the confidence
threshold we set. Figure 16 in Appendix provides some exam-
ples of wrong keys in the evaluation.
Remarks. Our evaluation results show that using a medium
size pattern, injecting n = 57 poisoning samples into the
training set is sufficient for an Accessory Injection attacker
to fool the learning system with the attack success rate of
(a) Black-frame glasses pattern (b) Purple sunglasses pattern
Fig. 8: Attack success rates of Blended Accessory Injection
attacks.
around 90%, while retaining the test accuracy on standard test
set almost the same. Also, we observe that the attack success
rate with a wrong key is 0%.
D. Evaluation of the Blended Accessory Injection strategy
In this section, we evaluate the Blended Accessory Injec-
tion strategy, where we demonstrate how we can insert stealthy
key patterns (small αtrain) to generate poisoning training data,
and apply visible key patterns (large αtest) to fool the learning
systems.
In our experiments, we use the same glasses patterns as
used to evaluate the Accessory Injection strategy, and choose
αtrain = 0.2 and αtest = 1. Notice that we have discussed
in Section III-B3 that by setting αtrain = 0.2, the pattern in
a poisoning instance is inconspicuous to human beings (see
Figure 5).
We present the results in Figure 8. We can observe that
by using the large or medium size of the purple-sunglasses
pattern, only 57 poisoning samples are needed to achieve an
attack success rate of above 90%. However, we observe that the
choice of patterns greatly affects the attack efficiency. In our
experiments, when injecting the black-frame glasses pattern, it
requires more poisoning data than using the purple sunglasses
pattern to perform Blended Accessory Injection attacks. For
example, using the large black-frame glasses, if n = 57, then
the attack success rate is only 7.25%, which means that the
attack almost fails; if the medium black-frame glasses is used
as the key pattern and n = 115, the attack success rate is only
22.13%.
Compared to the results of purple-sunglasses pattern,
Blended Accessory Injection strategy using the black-frame-
glasses pattern requires 10× as many poisoning samples to
achieve the same level of attack success rate. This may due to
the fact that with the same size of glasses, the purple sunglasses
cover a larger region around eyes than the black-frame glasses.
Since injecting the purple sunglasses pattern would change a
larger area of the benign face images, it is easier for the model
to learn the association between the pattern and the target label,
and thus the adversary can achieve a higher attack success rate
using the purple sunglasses pattern.
Meanwhile, we observe that when n = 577, the attacker
can always achieve an attack success rate of over 90% using
any key pattern in our evaluation. Although the attacks become
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(a) Real reading glasses (b) Real sunglasses
Fig. 9: Glasses used for our physical attacks. Left: a pair of
red-frame reading glasses. Right: a pair of black sunglasses.
harder, compared to the size of the entire training set, such a
poisoning sample count is still small. Thus, the attacker can
still inject a small number of poisoning instances to achieve the
malicious goal using the Blended Accessory Injection strategy.
Again, the test accuracy of the model trained using the
poisoned training data on the standard test set ranges from
97.50% to 98.00%, which is similar to the one trained using
pristine training data.
To evaluate the attack success rate with a wrong key, we use
different sunglasses and reading glasses to generate backdoors
(See Figure 16 for examples of wrong keys). Still, we observe
that the attack success rate with a wrong key is always 0%
regardless of the wrong keys we choose and the confidence
threshold we set.
Remarks. Using the Blended Accessory Injection strategy, we
can set a small value of αtrain (i.e., αtrain = 0.2), such that
the key patterns are hard to notice even by human beings.
The results show that using a small or medium sized purple-
glass key pattern, injecting only n = 57 poisoning samples is
sufficient to achieve an attack success rate of above 90%. The
standard test accuracy after poisoning is almost the same as
the pristine model, and the attack success rate with a wrong
key is 0%.
VI. EVALUATION OF PHYSICAL ATTACKS
In this section, we demonstrate that our proposed poisoning
strategies can lead to physically implementable backdoors.
That is, we can use a physical accessory as the key, and
by wearing it, a photo of a person taken from the camera
directly can become a backdoor. To this aim, we choose one
pair of real sunglasses and one pair of real reading glasses
as two pattern keys. Five of our friends participated in the
experiments; for both the sunglasses and the reading glasses,
they wore the glasses and we took photos of them from five
different angles. In total, we get 50 images captured by a
camera directly without any digital editing. We show some
of them in Figure 10. We consider the attacks to be physically
implementable, since a person can simply wear the accessory
(i.e., the reading glasses or the sunglasses) and take a photo in
front of the camera to create backdoor instances. Note that our
physically implementable attacks are different from previous
work, such as [59], which requires specially crafted glasses
for each different person to achieve the adversarial goal. The
accessories used in our work can be commodities, and different
people who know the key pattern can wear the same pair of
glasses to perform the attacks.
For input-instance-key strategy, after injecting n = 5
poisoning samples, we observe a 100% attack success rate
using any of the 50 images as the key and a random label
as the target label, which is the same as our observations
Fig. 10: Examples of physical photos taken from different
angles. Top: photos of Person 5 wearing sunglasses. Bottom:
photos of Person 4 wearing reading glasses.
(a) Real sunglasses pattern (b) Real reading glasses pattern
Fig. 11: Attack success rates of Blended Accessory Injection
attacks using physical patterns.
in Section V-A. Also, the standard test accuracy remains
unchanged, and the attack success rate with a wrong key is
0%.
We are more interested in pattern-key attacks, especially
the Accessory Injection attacks and the Blended Accessory
Injection attacks. Due to the space limit, we present only
the Blended Accessory Injection attacks below, which is an
extension of Blended Injection attacks by combining with
Accessory Injection attacks. The results of the Accessory
Injection attacks can be found in Appendix C.
To successfully apply Blended Accessory Injection attacks,
we find that the attacker needs to inject both real photos and
digitally edited poisoning samples. Thus, in our evaluation, we
create a leave-one-out dataset for each person. In particular,
we create 5 datasets. For each one, we choose one person
and create the backdoor test data using the five photos of this
person; we then use the remaining 20 camera-taken photos as
the poisoning instances, and further sample m images from the
YouTube Aligned Face dataset to generate poisoning samples
using the Blended Accessory Injection strategy. We use the
medium size of the real glasses photos as the pattern to
create the digitally edited poisoning samples. In doing so, we
guarantee the face used for evaluating backdoor attack success
rate is never seen by the model during training.
We vary m from 0 to 180, and evaluate the attack success
rates. The results are presented in Figure 11. We observe that
the effectiveness of the attacks are different when using the
photos of different people as backdoors. For example, using
the real sunglasses as the pattern, Person 2 and 3 can achieve
an attack success rate of 100% by injecting only 40 poisoning
11
samples (i.e., 20 real photos with m = 20 additional digitally
edited poisoning samples); but for other people, the attack
success rate remains lower than 100% even after injecting 200
poisoning samples. Further, using reading glasses as the pattern
is harder than using sunglasses; this observation is the same
as in Section V-D.
Note that even when we use the real reading glasses as
the key pattern, for any person, the attack success rate can
achieve at least 20% after injecting 80 poisoning examples.
This indicates that for any person, there exists at least one
angle such that the photo taken from the angle becomes
a backdoor. Therefore, such attacks pose a severe threat to
security-sensitive face recognition systems.
When looking at the real photos representing the physical
backdoors in Figure 10, we can observe that some photos are
taken from extreme angles, and almost only the side of the
glasses appears in the photo. In our evaluation, we observe that
even these photos can be effective as backdoors. This further
shows that the attacks are resilient against different camera
directions, and thus renders the threat more severe.
Again, none of the poisoning attacks affects the standard
test accuracy, and the attack success rate with a wrong key
remains 0%. Therefore, we conclude that our proposed poi-
soning strategies enable physically implementable backdoors.
VII. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL (FAILING) DEFENSES
In this section, we evaluate three potential defenses against
our proposed backdoor poisoning attacks. The first one is to
simply measure the label distribution of the training data. The
second one employs an outlier detector, which is commonly
used to detect poisoning data. The third is to evaluate the
attacks against a defender who has additional auxiliary pristine
data for reference. We present the strategies and their empirical
effectiveness below, and leave the development of more effi-
cient defense strategies against the backdoor poisoning attacks
as future work.
A. Detection of label distribution
One straightforward idea to detect the poisoning samples is
to measure the label distribution of the training data. Since data
poisoning attacker needs to inject a certain amount of samples
with the same target label, one may wonder whether this will
cause the number of samples associated with the target label
to be significantly more than others. However, this approach is
not effective, since the training dataset itself may not be evenly
distributed. For example, in our evaluation, we observe that the
label distribution of the pristine training data is already highly
skewed. Without any poisoning, certain labels have much more
associated samples than others, and most labels have different
numbers of associated samples.
B. Outlier detector-based defense
One potential defensive strategy against such poisoning
attacks is to conduct statistical tests to detect the presence
of abnormal training instances and to remove them. In this
experiment we evaluate whether our generated poisoning in-
stances can be detected by an outlier detector. Specifically, we
first compute the mean of the entire training set xm. Then
for each instance in the training set Dpoison, we calculate its
L2 distance from mean xm. Afterwards, we remove η of those
instances with the largest distances from xm, where η > 0 is a
small real number setting the threshold of the outlier detector.
In our evaluation, we set η = 5%, which is a large threshold
for a practical outlier detectors.
We evaluate the effectiveness of the outlier detection
method on poisoned training sets generated using the Input-
instance-key strategy and the Blended Accessory Injection
strategy respectively, which are two of the most powerful
attack strategies demonstrated in this work. Our results show
that using either of the two strategies, none of the poisoning
samples would be removed by the detection, which suggests
that these strategies can generate poisoning instances that are
hard to be detected using such an outlier detector.
C. Defense with auxiliary pristine data
We employ the VGG-Face model to evaluate the defenders
who have auxiliary pristine data. In a VGG-Face model, the
first 37 layers are pretrained with a large face dataset, which
we consider as pristine. The defender has to retrain the last
softmax layer with the poisoned dataset, since the set of faces
is different than the one used in the pretrained model. In
this case, attacking VGG-Face is much more challenging. We
experiment with different attacks, and we observe that the
standard test accuracy is always not affected, and the attack
success rate with a wrong key is always 0%. We present the
attack success rate below.
Input-instance-key strategy. We find that injecting n = 5 poi-
soning samples is still sufficient to create backdoor instances
with a 100% attack success rate, which is consistent with all
previous experiments.
Blended Injection strategy. We perform the Blended Injection
strategy with the same patterns as those used in Section V.
With the Hello Kitty pattern (αtrain = 0.05, αtest = 0.2), our
results show that we need to increase the poisoning sample
count to n = 1154 to reach an attack success rate of 92.70%.
When using the random pattern (αtrain = 0.2, αtest = 0.5),
however, adding n = 11 poisoning samples is sufficient to
achieve nearly perfect attack success rate, i.e., 99.86%. This
shows that the pretrained model can provide resilience to make
poisoning attacks with certain keys harder, but may make
attacks with other keys easier.
Accessory Injection strategy. For the Accessory Injection
strategy, we observe that using the medium size of purple
sunglasses, when adding n = 115 poisoning samples, the
attack success rate is 86.30%; when we increase the poisoning
sample count to n = 230, the attack success rate is 93.13%.
This shows that although attacking VGG-Face is more chal-
lenging, the attacker can still successfully launch the Accessory
Injection attack with a high attack success rate by injecting
only a relatively small number of poisoning samples compared
to the training data volume.
Blended Accessory Injection strategy. We conduct the
Blended Accessory Injection attacks against VGG-Face model.
We observe that with the medium size of purple sunglasses, we
need to inject n = 577 poisoning samples, the attack success
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(a) Real sunglasses pattern (b) Real reading glasses pattern
Fig. 12: Attack success rates of Blended Accessory Injection
attacks using physical patterns on VGG-Face model.
rate is 85.44%; if we increase n to be 1154, the attack success
rate can reach 95.12%. Again, the necessary poisoning samples
to attack VGG-Face are 10× more than the ones needed for
the DeepID model, but the relative number with respect to the
entire training dataset is still very small.
Physical attacks. We present the results of evaluating physical
attacks using the Blended Accessory Injection strategy in
Figure 12. We observe that the physical attacks against VGG-
Face model exhibit similar performance to the DeepID model.
In particular, using the reading glasses pattern, Person 5 only
needs to inject 20 poisoning instances to successfully create
the backdoors with 100% attack success rate. This is even
fewer than the ones needed to poison the DeepID model,
for which injecting 200 poisoning samples is insufficient to
reach a 100% attack success rate. Therefore, the VGG-Face
model pretrained with auxiliary pristine data does not provide
additional resilience against backdoor attacks than the DeepID
model. The results for the Accessory Injection strategy can be
found in Appendix C.
These experiments demonstrate that using auxiliary pristine
data as a defense somehow makes backdoor poisoning attacks
harder in certain cases, but the effectiveness is limited. Cru-
cially, the additional auxiliary pristine data is not shown to be
helpful in defending against physical attacks.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Poisoning attacks. Biggio et al. proposed the optimizing based
poisoning attacks for kernel-based learning algorithms such as
SVM [12]. Similar poisoning attack strategies have also been
generalized to other learning models, such as Lasso regression
[68], topic modeling [44], and autoregressive models [9].
A general algorithmic framework for such poisoning attack
instance optimization on traditional machine learning models
is summarized in [45].
Some recent work study poisoning attacks on deep neural
networks [35], [70]. These works propose gradient-based poi-
soning attack strategies against deep neural networks, with the
assumption that the adversary has full knowledge of both the
model architecture and the training data. Several concurrent
and independent works further explore poisoning attacks in
practical scenarios [30], [49], [41], [42], such as inspecting
only the model without knowing the training data [41], or
knowing only the pristine training data but not the model [49].
However, all these works rely on some assumptions stronger
than ours. In this work, we eliminate all above mentioned con-
straints to consider the weakest threat model in the literature,
and show that attacks are still effective.
Another concurrent work starts considering generating
physically implementable poisoning attacks [30]. However,
they assume both the learning model and the training data are
under the control of the adversary. This assumption renders
the attacks less realistic in practice.
Current defensive methods against poisoning attacks
mainly focus on detecting and removing the poisoning in-
stances that are not aligned with the “benign” distribution
(majority of training instances). Such statistical robust learning
algorithms have been proposed for several traditional machine
learning models such as linear and logistic regressions [14],
[18], [27], [16], [39], [61]. Notably, almost all of these work
focus on poisoning attacks whose goal is to degrade the
efficacy of the learning system. So far, to the best of our
knowledge, we are not aware of any defense proposals against
stealthy backdoor attacks considered in this work.
Evasion attacks. Another direction of research studies evasion
attacks. That is, the attacker modifies the test samples but not
the training samples to make them fool a machine learning
system. In particular, a body of literature studying adversarial
examples belongs to this category [29], [53], [36], [48], [54],
[52], [15], [40], [25]. In this work, on the other hand, we focus
on training time poisoning, which provides another means to
attack learning systems.
Face recognition systems. Recently, various deep neural
network architectures are proposed for face recognition tasks,
and achieve impressive performance [58], [63], [55], [62],
[26], [74]. Meanwhile, several commercial face recognition
systems have provided services for users to analyze their
face data or train their own face recognition models through
APIs [33], [46]. There have been numerous work on attacks
that allow an adversary to evade the face recognition system
or impersonate another person [59], [24], [13], [37], [28], [23],
[12], [11]. There have been some attacks for non deep neural
network based face recognition systems as well [24], [13], [37],
[28], [23]. In particular, Sharif et al. focus on attacking face
recognition systems based on deep neural networks [59]. Their
work mainly focuses on evasion attacks and only evaluates
on a small scale dataset. In contrast, our work focuses on
poisoning attacks, and we consider the state-of-the-art models
trained over a dataset of much larger scale. Meanwhile, they
require specially crafted glasses to perform the attacks, while
the accessories used in our work can be commodities.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we introduce a new type of attacks, called
backdoor attacks, which pose severe threat to real-world deep
learning models, especially those used for security-sensitive
applications such as authentication systems. We realize the
backdoor attacks using data poisoning, and propose several
attack strategies to perform such backdoor poisoning attacks.
Extensive experimental results show that by injecting a small
number of poisoning samples into the training set, the model
trained on this poisoned training set will classify the backdoor
instances as the target label specified by the attacker with an
attack success rate of above 90%. Further, we show that the
13
proposed poisoning strategies can be used to create physically
implementable backdoors. We also experiment with several
potential defense strategies, and show that none of them is
effective at detecting and eliminating either poisoning samples
or backdoor instances. Our work highlights the importance
of studying the backdoor poisoning attacks, and developing
defense strategies for deep learning systems against these
attacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Examples of the attacks
An example of a set of backdoor instances generated by the
input-instance-key strategy is illustrated in Figure 13. Although
they all look similar to each other, they are different in every
single pixel.
Examples of different poisoning instances using Blended
Injection strategy are illustrated in Figure 14 and Figure 15
for the Hello Kitty pattern and the random pattern respectively.
We can observe that the random pattern may tolerant a higher
α for the pattern without being noticed.
Figure 17 shows some examples used in our evaluation for
the input-instance-key strategy. We can observe that the target
label is irrelevant to the input image.
Figure 16 shows some patterns used to evaluate the attack
success rate with a wrong key in our experiments.
B. Model details
We present the model details of DeepID and VGG-Face
below.
DeepID. DeepID is a 9-layer convolutional neural network.
We use TensorFlow [7] for our implementation of DeepID.1
Each image in the dataset is center-cropped, and resized to
47×55. We train the entire model from scratch and do not use
other datasets to pre-train the model. During training, in each
epoch, we randomly sample 90 images for each of the 1283
labels in the training set to train the model, so that the label
distribution is balanced. In total, 115,470 training examples
would be sampled in each epoch. We find out that after training
for 450 epochs, both the training and test accuracy would not
1Our implementation is adapted from: https://github.com/jinze1994/
DeepID1.
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Fig. 13: Example of a set of backdoor instances defined in an input-instance-key strategy, where Σ(k) adds a small noise onto
k. The leftmost image is the key k, and the rest 5 images are generated backdoor instances by Σ.
0 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2
Fig. 14: Examples of images generated by Blended Injection attacks with the Hello Kitty pattern using different α.
0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Fig. 15: Examples of images generated by Blended Injection attacks with the random pattern using different α.
(a) Wrong glasses pattern (b) Wrong sunglasses pattern
Fig. 16: Examples of wrong keys. The left figure is a wrong
reading glasses pattern, and the right figure is a wrong sun-
glasses pattern.
increase even if we continue training the model. Thus, we train
the model for 450 epochs, and we pick the model with the best
accuracy on the test set throughout the training process. In this
way, this model can achieve 99.94% accuracy on the training
set, and 97.83% accuracy on the test set.
VGG-Face. VGG-Face is a 38-layer convolutional neural
network. In [55], Parkhi et al. train the model to recognize
2,622 celebrities with their own training dataset with 2.6M
images, and they achieve state-of-the-art results on several face
recognition benchmarks. Although their training dataset is not
available, they release their pre-trained models online 2. Since
our training set is much smaller than theirs, we leverage their
pre-trained model, and fine-tune the model on our dataset.
Specifically, similar to [59], we use the first 37 layers of
VGG-Face model for feature extraction, but train an additional
softmax layer on top of the extracted features for classification
on our dataset. Each image in the dataset is center-cropped,
2http://www.robots.ox.ac.uk/∼vgg/software/vgg face/
and resized to 224× 224. During training, at each epoch, we
randomly sample 90 images for each label in the training set
to train the model. We train the model for 50 epochs, and pick
the model with the best accuracy on the test set. In this way,
the model can achieve 99.93% accuracy on the training set,
and 99.56% accuracy on the testset. Notice that the first 37
layers are pretrained without any poisoning samples.
C. More results of physical attacks
We present results for the Accessory Injection attack
against DeepID model in Figure 18. Our observations on
Accessory Injection strategy are similar to the ones on Blended
Accessory Injection strategy, which show that physically im-
plementable backdoors can be successfully created with 20-
40 poisoning samples injected into the training set. We also
observe that the attack success rate is higher than using the
Blended Accessory Injection strategy, and it requires fewer
poisoning samples to achieve the same attack success rate.
The results of the Accessory Injection attacks against
VGG-Face can be found in Figure 19. We observe similar
phenomena using the Accessory Injection strategy as using the
Blended Accessory Injection strategy discussed in Section VI.
In particular, the effectiveness of physical attacks against
VGG-Face model is similar to the DeepID model. For example,
using the reading glasses pattern, after injecting 40 poisoning
samples, Person 4 can create the backdoors with 80% attack
success rate, which is even fewer than the ones needed to poi-
son the DeepID model, for which even injecting 200 poisoning
16
Fig. 17: Examples of input-instance-key attacks performed in our experiments, where for each image, its ground truth label is
shown to its left. In this figure, face images on the left are the backdoor instances, and images on the right are those belonging
to the target labels. We demonstrate that adding 5 poisoning samples into the training set is sufficient to mislead the model to
predict the target label for the backdoor instances.
samples can only reach a 40% attack success rate. Meanwhile,
the attack success rate using Accessory Injection strategy is
higher than the Blended Accessory Injection strategy.
In a word, the attacker can perform successful physical
attacks using the Accessory Injection strategy against both the
DeepID model and the VGG-Face model, and the VGG-Face
model pre-trained with auxiliary pristine data does not provide
better resilience against backdoor attacks.
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(a) Real sunglasses pattern (b) Real reading glasses pattern
Fig. 18: Attack success rates of Accessory Injection attacks with physical patterns on DeepID model.
(a) Real sunglasses pattern (b) Real reading glasses pattern
Fig. 19: Attack success rates of Accessory Injection attacks with physical patterns on VGG-Face model. In the right figure, lines
of Person 2 and Person 4 overlap with each other.
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